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Abstract
Resource reallocation problems are common in real life and therefore gain an increasing interest in Computer Science and
Economics. Such problems consider agents living in a society and negotiating their resources with each other in order to
improve the welfare of the population. In many studies however, the unrealistic context considered, where agents have a
ﬂawless knowledge and unlimited interaction abilities, impedes the application of these techniques in real life problematics. In
this paper, we study how agents should behave in order to maximize the welfare of the society. We propose a multi-agent
method based on autonomous agents endowed with a local knowledge and local interactions. Our approach features a more
realistic environment based on social networks, inside which we provide the behavior for the agents and the negotiation
settings required for them to lead the negotiation processes towards socially optimal allocations. We prove that bilateral
transactions of restricted cardinality are sufﬁcient in practice to converge towards an optimal solution for different social
objectives. An experimental study supports our claims and highlights the impact of a realistic environment on the efﬁciency of
the techniques utilized.
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 Introduction
In the past few years, an increasing number of studies focused on resource allocation problems, either from a centralized or a
distributed point of view. Optimally allocating a set of resources between agents in an artiﬁcial society is an important issue in
Computer Science as well as in Economics. Indeed, numerous applications can be formulated as allocation problems in
various domains ranging from auctions (Bachrach & Rosenschein, 2008; Sandholm, 2002) to industrial procurement
(Giovannucci et al., 2004), including grid computing (Galstyan et al., 2005).
Centralized solving techniques only aim to determine the best way to assign resources in order to optimize the objective
function, without consideration for their origin. At the opposite, distributed solving techniques consider that resources are
initially allocated between agents, and the aim is to determine a sequence of transactions leading to an optimal allocation.
However, most of these techniques cannot be used in practice: either they do not consider some constraints inherent to the
application context or they rely on unrealistic assumptions. For instance, in many studies (e.g. Endriss et al., (2006) or
Chevaleyre et al., (2010), agents can compensate disadvantageous transactions using money from an inﬁnite wallet. This
way, any condition on a transaction can be satisﬁed. Similarly, relationships between agents are often not considered whereas
this characteristic occurs in many applications. Indeed, agents in the population usually all know each other and can negotiate
freely with each other. However, communications are often restricted in a signiﬁcant number of applications (Lieberman et al.,
2005): business, spatial, applications based on social networks or Internet applications. Most of the time, these studies rely on
omniscient agents which know everything about everybody (i.e. ﬂawless knowledge of the whole society). However, in large-
scale applications (with a large number of agents), the agents only have access to local information. Since these assumptions
are not plausible from our point of view, we choose to consider a more realistic environment where agents have incomplete
knowledge and limited interaction possibilities.
The aim of this paper is not to prove the existence of solutions with respect to a speciﬁc context (it is certainly important but
not sufﬁcient in practice) but to propose a distributed mechanism based on agent negotiations and which can be used in a








order to lead the negotiation processes towards the best solutions. These solutions, which are achieved by an adaptive and
anytime algorithm, can be considered as emergent.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the limitations of the current studies on allocation problems. Section 3
deﬁnes some basic notions and describes what, from our point of view, is a more realistic environment. The different
parameters on which relies the solving method we propose are also presented. Section 4 introduces the simulation protocol
and discusses about the evaluation of agent negotiations. Characteristics favoring the achievement of socially interesting
allocations are also analyzed with respect to the utilitarian and the egalitarian welfare notions. Section 7 concludes this study
with a summary of the most efﬁcient negotiation settings according to different scenarios.
 Background
Different ways exist in the literature to evaluate the quality of resource allocations. One of them, called social efﬁciency, can
be measured owing to notions from the social choice theory (Moulin, 1988; Arrow et al., 2002). These notions evaluate
different aspects of allocations in a global way, aggregating the satisfaction of all the agents. The average satisfaction is
evaluated according to the utilitarian welfare. The egalitarian welfare focuses on the weakest satisfaction. The Nash product
considers both fairness and average satisfaction while elitist societies only consider the largest satisfaction. These four
welfare notions are the most important and the most widely used to date (Endriss et al., 2006; Chevaleyre et al., 2010;
Ramezani & Endriss, 2009; Brams & Taylor, 1996) and only those will be considered in this paper for this reason.
The Pareto efﬁciency is also an omnipresent notion in the literature (Moulin, 1988; Arrow et al., 2002). An allocation is Pareto-
efﬁcient if there does not exist another allocation that would increase the satisfaction of an agent without decreasing the
satisfaction of any other agent. This notion is useful when agents are purely self-centered. However, in this paper, the
objective is to ﬁnd the best agent behavior to maximize the welfare of the agent society. Thus, selﬂess agents are also
considered. In such a case, the Pareto efﬁciency appears as a less interesting notion and is not considered in this paper.
Many studies focusing on the different aspects of allocation problems evaluate the allocations using the welfare notions
mentioned above. For instance, Sandholm, (Sandholm, 1998) establishes essential theoretical results for allocation problems
in utilitarian societies. He classiﬁes the different kinds of transaction and he also demonstrates the existence of transaction
sequences leading to optimal solutions depending on the kinds of transaction allowed during negotiations. Other studies
extend this theoretical work like (Endriss et al., 2006; Chevaleyre et al., 2010). They consider different welfare functions and
design various scenarios according to many representations of agents preferences. They establish convergence results on
negotiation processes according to these scenarios. Complexity of allocation problems is investigated as well. The
computational complexity is analyzed to check the sufﬁciency of transactions involving one resource at a time in given cases
(Dunne et al., 2005; Dunne & Chevaleyre, 2008). These papers characterize solutions, studying the desirable properties
according to different scenarios. However, these studies do not focus on the mechanism required in practice to achieve a
solution maximizing the welfare of a society. These studies are based on omniscient agents that can negotiate without
restrictions. Only self-centered agents are considered and collaboration is meaningless.
In (Chevaleyre et al., 2007), authors study the allocation of goods to eliminate envy within a population. They establish
convergence and complexity results on graph allocation problems. The authors do not consider the agent behaviour to
implement in order to achieve optimal solutions in practice. Task allocation problems are also studied when communication
abilities between agents are restricted (de Weerdt et al., 2007). The authors only consider the utilitarian perspective of the
problem and propose some exponential algorithms. Simulations are performed on random graphs of different kinds (small-
world, scale-free, ...). Some authors focus on topological issues, where the behaviour and the performance of complex
systems are studied according to topological characteristics (Dekker, 2007)). Instead of studying allocation problems in a
generic way, some authors focus on a speciﬁc game, e.g. the ultimatum game, and study the evolution of fairness on complex
networks (Xianyu, 2010). Some studies focus on dynamic populations. For instance, (Zoethout et al., 2010) studies the impact
of a newcomer on the efﬁciency and the performance according to different scenarios. The authors use different performance
indicators that can be compared to social measures. The time performance of the slowest agent corresponds to an egalitarian
metric whereas the sum of the individual performances of all the agents (the labour cost) corresponds to an utilitarian point of
view. In this paper, the environment is static: the size of the artiﬁcial society and the total number of resources do not vary.
 Multiagent resource allocation problem
In this section, resource allocation problems are deﬁned and characterized according to several crucial parameters. We
describe our claim for a more realistic environment and we discuss about its importance and its impact on the efﬁciency of
solving techniques. Different elements on which our agent-based solving method relies are ﬁnally described (Nongaillard et al.,
2008). All the concepts are deﬁned in such a way that their distributed implementation is facilitated.
Basic notions







preferences on all the resources and have a bundle containing their own resources. The aim of resource allocation problems
is to ﬁnd an allocation, i.e. an assignment of the set of resources between the agents of the population, maximizing (or
minimizing) a given objective.
Several parameters affect the properties of an allocation problem. Even a slight difference between the characteristics of two
allocation problems can have a fundamental impact on the way these problems can be solved efﬁciently. One of these crucial
parameters is the nature of the resources considered. It affects directly the properties of resource allocations.
In this paper, resources are assumed atomic, not shareable and unique. Since resources are assumed atomic, agents cannot
divide them in order to trade only a part. For instance, a book is an atomic resource: trading it page by page is impossible.
Resources are not shareable which means the satisfaction of an agent only depends on the resources in its bundle, i.e.
resources that belong to another agent cannot be considered in the evaluation of the satisfaction of the agent. Finally,
resources are unique and tagged with a unique identiﬁcation number. Such an environment is called single-unit (in contrast
with a multi-unit environment where several similar resources cannot be distinguished). For instance, let us consider a box of
8 eggs. It is possible either to consider the whole box as an atomic resource or to consider each egg as a resource. In the
latter case, owning the ﬁrst egg of the box is not equivalent to owning the last one. Both cases correspond to two different
resource allocations.
According to these characteristics, a resource allocation can be deﬁned more formally as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Allocation)   Given a set   of m resources and a population   of n agents, a resource allocation A is an
ordered list of n resource bundles Riↆ  describing the resources owned by each agent i:
A = [R1,..., Rn],        1,..., n∈ ,    A∈ .
where   is the set of all possible allocations. A resource allocation also satisﬁes the following properties:
Ri =  ,     Ri = ∅,    and    A(i) = Ri, i∈ .
In other words, an allocation is constituted by the ordered list of the agent bundles. Moreover all the resources must be
allocated to the agents and a resource can only belong to one agent at a time.
As described in Section 1, this paper focuses on distributed methods based on agent negotiations according to a more
realistic context. We assume the knowledge of an agent is incomplete: an agent only knows its preferences, its bundle of
resources and a list of neighbors (agents with which interactions are possible). This way, each agent is able to negotiate with
the restricted number of agents formed by its neighborhood. The agents also negotiate according to a given policy: the
transactions they use for trading resources belong to a given set. A negotiation problem can thus be deﬁned more formally as
follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Negotiation problem)   A negotiation problem is a tuple 
〈 , , ʔ, 〉, where   = {1,..., n} is a ﬁnite population of n agents,   = {r1,..., rm} is a ﬁnite set of m resources, ʔ is a
set containing the kinds of transaction allowed during the negotiations, and   is the contact graph.
Restrictions on the communications between agents are modeled by a contact graph   where the nodes represent the
agents and the edges represent the interaction possibilities between the agents so that two agents linked in the graph can
negotiate together. Note that in practice this graph is distributed among the agents of population   as agent neighborhoods.
Deﬁnition 3 (Contact graph)   A contact graph is an undirected graph   = ( , ). Two agents can communicate if an
edge from   between them exists. Note that this relation is symmetric.
An agent can be deﬁned in a generic way by a resource bundle, a valuation function describing its preferences, a list of agents
(also called neighbors) with which it is able to communicate, a behavior describing how it negotiates with others and an
acceptability criterion related to its decision-making.
Deﬁnition 4 (Agent)   An agent  i∈  is a tuple 〈Ri, vi, Bi, Ci, Ni〉, where Ri is the set of mi resources the agent owns, vi is
the valuation function (the agent preferences), Ni is the list of ni neighbors, Bi deﬁnes the agent behavior according to which
the agent negotiates, and Ci is its acceptability criterion on which is based its decisions.
Example 1   Figure 1 illustrates a negotiation problem based on a population of 6 agents and a set of 9 resources (   = {1,...,
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6},   = {r1,..., r9}).
These resources are initially allocated to the agents. Each agent owns a resource bundle and their aggregation constitutes the
initial resource allocation, which can be extracted from Figure 1 as follows:
A =  {r3} {r1, r4, r5} {r6, r9} {r7, r8} {} {r2} .
According to allocation A, agent 1 only owns r3 while agent 2 owns 3 resources r1, r4 and r5. No resource belongs to agent 5,
etc...
The contact graph describes the interaction possibilities of the agents. Two agents can only communicate if they are directly
linked. According to the topology of the contact graph described in Figure 1, we can say that agent 4 is able to negotiate with
agents 2 and 6 while agent 3 can only communicate with agent 1.
Figure 1:An example of negotiation problem
Considering a centralized technique, the resources and the agent preferences are gathered in a central entity which
determines an optimal resource distribution performed afterwards. However, considering a distributed method based on agent
negotiations, the solving process proceeds as follows. An agent is selected to be the initiator, agent 1 for instance. It negotiates
in its neighborhood by ﬁrst selecting one neighbor, agent 2 for instance, and then negotiating with it according to its behavior.
They both locally determine that the exchange of resources r3 and r5 is acceptable, with respect to their own criterion. This
transaction is performed and the resource allocation evolves. A new initiator is selected and the process continues until no
more acceptable transaction can be determined.
Many applications can be modeled using such a representation. For instance, home exchange websites which appear on the
Internet. Each customer/agent enters the system with one resource: its house. They want to exchange their house for
another one during a given time period (for holidays for example). The contact graph can be built out of the customers
requirements. The objective of such an application is to satisfy a maximum number of customers without neglecting any of
them (every customer who lend their house must ﬁnd another one in return). The next section is dedicated to another crucial
model parameter: the evaluation of an allocation from a local and a global point of view. The importance and the impact of using
a contact graph is also discussed.
Individual and collective welfare
The satisfaction of an agent depends directly on its personal resources. It can be evaluated by a valuation function






In many studies in the literature, the individual welfare of an agent (i.e. its satisfaction) only depends on its utility (Endriss et al.,
2006; Chevaleyre et al., 2010; Sandholm, 1998). In such studies, money is introduced during the transactions. Indeed,
transactions are performed if and only if they satisfy all the conditions imposed by all the agents involved in the transaction.
Money can be used to compensate a disadvantageous transaction leading to a loss of utility for example. One constraint only
controls the use of money: it prevents the creation of money during a transaction. In other words, the amount of money given
by an agent (negative value) corresponds to the exact amount of money received by the other agent (positive value). The
sum of compensatory payments of a transaction must be null. This argument seems consistent and reasonable. However, it is
not sufﬁcient and it leads to unrealistic situations since the agent wallet is not bounded. An agent is considered as rich as
required to compensate any disadvantageous transaction. Inﬁnite compensatory payments do not represent a plausible
assumption in most applications. Instead of allowing inﬁnite compensatory payments, we choose not to consider money and to
restrict the valuation function to a utility function in this paper.
Various representations of agent preferences exist in the literature (Doyle, 2004; Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In this paper, agents
express their preferences using a cardinal quantitative representation: an additive utility function.
Deﬁnition 5 (Utility function)   An agent evaluates its individual welfare using an additive utility function ui : 2 → . When
agent  i∈  owns a set of resources Riↆ , its utility is evaluated as follows:
ui(Ri) =  ui(r),        i∈ ,    Riↆ .
Example 2   Let us illustrate the evaluation of the individual welfare using a simple example, based on a population of 3 agents
 = {1, 2, 3} and a set of 6 resources   = {r1,..., r6}. The agents preferences are described in Table 1. According to this
table, agent 1 associates with resource r2 the utility value: u1(r2) = 7.
Table 1: Individual Welfare – Agent preferences
ui(rj)
Resource Set 
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6
Population 
1 10 7 10 9 2 1
2 6 10 3 4 8 6
3 1 2 1 2 1 3
If the initial resource allocation is A = [{r4}{r1, r2, r6}{r3, r5}], then the utility of all the agents can be easily computed as follows:
u1(R1) = u1({r4}) = u1(r4) = 9    
u2(R2) = u2({r1, r2, r6}) = u2(r1) + u1(r2) + u2(r6) = 6 + 10 + 6 = 22    
u3(R3) = u3({r3, r5}) = u3(r3) + u3(r5) = 1 + 1 = 2    
The individual welfare is the evaluation of an allocation from an agent point of view thanks to its utility function. The quality of an
allocation must be evaluated from a global point of view. In this purpose, notions from the social choice theory are usually used
(Moulin, 1988; Arrow et al., 2002). These notions aggregate the satisfaction of all agents in the population to evaluate an
allocation. In this paper, we focus on the four most important notions.
The most widely used notion is the utilitarian welfare, which optimizes the average satisfaction in a population.
Deﬁnition 6 (Utilitarian welfare)   The utilitarian welfare of a resource allocation A corresponds to the sum of individual welfare.
swu(A) =  ui(Ri),        A∈ .
The egalitarian welfare of an allocation corresponds to the individual welfare of the poorest agent in the population. Its
maximization tends to reduce inequalities in the societies.






swe(A) =  ui(Ri),        A∈ .
The Nash product considers the average individual welfare and the inequalities within an agent population. This notion can be
viewed as a compromise between the utilitarian and the egalitarian welfare. This notion is independent of utility scales and it
also normalizes the agents utility. However this notion becomes meaningless if non-positive values are used.
Deﬁnition 8 (Nash product)   The Nash product of an allocation A corresponds to the product of individual welfare.
swn(A) =  ui(Ri),        A∈ .
Finally, the elitist welfare only considers the welfare of the richest agent in the population. This notion can be useful in the
context of artiﬁcial societies for instance, where agents have a common objective. This objective must be fulﬁlled irrespective
of the agent which achieves it.
Deﬁnition 9 (Elitist welfare)   The elitist welfare of an allocation A corresponds to the individual welfare of the richest agent in
the population.
swe (A) =  ui(Ri),        A∈ .
All the basic notions having been presented, we can use them to discuss the importance of the social graph in the next
section.
Importance of the contact graph
Since only few studies consider restrictions on agent interactions, it is legitimate to investigate the importance of such a
parameter. Indeed, negotiation processes, which lead to optimal solutions according to complete communication possibilities
(i.e., based on complete social graphs), may only lead to solutions far from the optimum when communications are restricted.
Proposition 1 (Social graph impact)   Independently of the objective function considered, a restricted social graph may
prevent the achievement of optimal resource allocations.
Proof. Let us prove this proposition by a counter-example based on a population   = {1, 2, 3} and a set of resources   =
{r1, r2, r3}. The objective is to maximize the Nash welfare. All the agents are assumed self-interested (they only accept
transactions increasing their own individual welfare). The agent preferences are described in Table 2 while the contact graph,
which describes the interaction possibilities, is represented in Figure 2.






1 3 1 9
2 1 4 1
3 10 2 3
According to the topology of this social graph, agent 2 can communicate with agents 1 and 3, while they can only






Figure 2:Example of a restricted contact graph with 3 agents
Two resource swaps (one-for-one resource replacement) only are possible. Agents 1 and 2 can exchange r1 and r2 or
agents 2 and 3 can exchange respectively r2 and r3. Both cases lead to a decrease of the utility of at least one participant.
Thus, no acceptable exchange is possible here.
However, allocation A is not an optimal solution. Indeed, the swap of r1 and r3 by agents 1 and 3 would lead to a better
allocation A' =  {r3}{r2}{r1} , which is associated with swn(A') = 360. Hence, due to the topology of the social graph
restricting the interaction possibilities, the negotiation process cannot achieve an optimal solution. 
Considering the social graph also has an indirect inﬂuence on negotiation processes. While it may not be important to consider
the order in which the agents negotiate when the social graph is complete, this order becomes essential when
communications between agents are restricted. Indeed, if restrictions on agent communications are not considered,
resources can always be traded with all other agents.
Proposition 2 (Negotiation order)   Independently of the objective function considered, the order in which agents negotiate
with each other may prevent the achievement of optimal resource allocations.
Proof. The proposition can be proved by a counter-example. Let us consider a population   = {1, 2, 3} of selﬁsh agents and
a set of resources   = {r1, r2, r3}. The objective is still to maximize the Nash welfare. The agent preferences are described
in Table 3 and the contact graph is illustrated in Figure 2. The initial resource allocation is A=[{r1}{r2}{r3}] with swn(A) = 6.
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Let us now assume that agent 2 initiates a negotiation. According to the topology, two partners are possible. Depending on the
choice of the initiator, the negotiation process may end on a sub-optimal allocation. Indeed, if agent 2 negotiates ﬁrst with
agent 1, the allocation achieved is A' = [{r2}{r1}{r3}] with swn(A') = 50. However, if agent 3 is chosen ﬁrst, the allocation
achieved is A'' =  {r1}{r3}{r2}  with swn(A'') = 126.
Hence, the order of negotiation becomes an important parameter to consider when the interaction possibilities are restricted.
In this section, we have shown the importance of considering restricted communication abilities, as it occurs in many
applications. These restrictions represent more plausible assumptions but they also have important consequences for the
negotiation efﬁciency. The topological characteristics may prevent the achievement of optimal solutions. Moreover, the order in
which agents negotiate may also lead negotiation processes to sub-optimal allocations. In spite of their respective impact,
these two parameters have not been considered so far. The context of many former studies can be considered as ideal while
ours is more realistic.
A negotiation process between agents changes an initial resource allocation to an optimal one using local transactions. Agents
only accept transactions that satisfy their acceptability criterion. When no agent is able to ﬁnd an acceptable transaction with
respect to its behavior then the negotiation process is considered as over. The next section describes the transactions and
the different acceptability criteria.
Transactions and acceptability criterion
During a negotiation process, the resource allocation evolves step by step by means of local transactions between agents.
The resource trafﬁc is generated by these transactions as they move resources successively from the bundles of one agent
to another. Transactions can be classiﬁed in two main families (Sandholm, 1998): multilateral transactions where many agents
can be involved simultaneously and bilateral transactions where only two agents at a time can trade resources. Although a few
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j = 10    
ʔ = {〈1, 1〉} ⃒ #ʴi
j = 199    
ʔ = {〈x, y〉| x≤2, y≤2} ⃒ #ʴi





studies are dedicated on multilateral transactions (Endriss & Maudet, 2005), no algorithm exists to determine them in a
scalable way. Consequently, only bilateral transactions are considered in this paper.
Two agents at a time are involved in bilateral transactions: an initiator and its partner. Bilateral transactions can be
characterized by the number of resources that both participants can propose. Thus, it can be deﬁned in a generic way as
follows:
Deﬁnition 10 (Bilateral transactions)   A bilateral transaction between two agents i, j∈ , denoted by ʴi
j, is initiated by agent i
and involves a partner agent j. It is a pair ʴi
j〈u, v〉 = (ˁi, ˁj), where the initiator i offers a set ˁi of u resources and its partner
j offers a set ˁj of v resources.
A transaction ʴ transforms an initial allocation A into a new allocation A'. Different notations exist in the literature to express
such an evolution using the state of the system before and after the transaction, like ʴ = (A, A') for instance. All bilateral
transactions classiﬁed in (Sandholm, 1998) can be represented using the model presented in Deﬁnition 10. For instance, a
〈1, 0〉-transaction corresponds to a gift (also called O-contract): the initiator gives a unique resource without counterpart.
The complexity of a negotiation between two agents is signiﬁcantly affected by the maximum number of resources the agents
are willing to offer.
Proposition 3 (Bilateral complexity)   The number of possible bilateral transactions between two agents i, j∈  where exactly
u and v resources can be respectively offered is:
#ʴi
j =  ￗ .
The kinds of transaction allowed during a negotiation, denoted by ʔ, deﬁne a negotiation policy. For instance, the agents may
also be allowed to offer resources in a transaction up to a speciﬁed amount. Let us call ''up to 〈2, 2〉'' the negotiation policy
according to which the agents can offer either nothing, one or two resources. The kinds of transaction allowed can be written
explicitly as:
"up to {〈2, 2〉}"⃔ʔ = {〈x, y〉| x≤2, y≤2}
Proposition 4 (Complexity of Negotiation policy)   If the two agents i, j∈  are allowed to offer up to u' and v' resources (
u'≤mi, v'≤mj) then the number of possible bilateral transactions between them is:
#ʴi
j =   - 1.
Proof. A negotiation policy is deﬁned based on the number of resources an agent can offer. If an agent can offer up to three
resources then it can offer any subset of his bundle containing at most three resources.   represents the possible
number of offers containing exactly k resources that agent i can propose (according to the number of resources it owns mi).
The total number of offers an agent can propose can be computed by a simple summation of such terms. Once the number of
offers has been computed for each agent, determining the possible number of transactions between them is trivial. 
Example 3   For instance, let us consider two agents i, j∈  involved in a negotiation initiated by agent i. These agents own
bundles of respectively 10 and 20 resources. Let us determine the possible number of transactions according to different
negotiation policies.
When only gifts from the initiator are allowed, 10 transactions are possible since the agent owns 10 resources only. When
swaps only are allowed, both participants offer one unique resource. Thus, 200 different transactions are possible. However,
when participants can offer up to two resources from their bundle, the number of possible transactions explodes up to 40,500.
According to the kinds of transaction allowed, a negotiation can quickly become unscalable. Restricting the cardinality of the
allowed transactions is thus essential to guarantee the scalability of the solving method.
In a distributed environment where agents have only access to local information, the ﬁniteness of the solving process is





proﬁtability of a transaction. When no agent is able to ﬁnd an acceptable transaction in its neighborhood, the negotiation
process stops. The most widely used criterion is the individual rationality (Camerer, 2003; Sandholm, 1998; Montet & Serra,
2003). Since no compensatory payment is allowed, a rational agent only accepts transactions that increase its individual
welfare. This notion can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 11 (Individually rational agent)   A rational agent accepts only transactions ʴ which change an initial allocation A into
another one A' while increasing its individual welfare:
ui(Ri') > ui(Ri),        i∈ .
In (Endriss et al., 2006), the notion of cooperative rationality has been introduced. The authors proved that any sequence of
cooperative rational transactions leads to Pareto optimal allocations. However, Pareto optimal allocations can be far from
socially optimal allocations. Moreover, the notion of cooperative rationality cannot be used easily in practice. Indeed, a weak
inequality may lead to a cycle of transactions between equivalent allocations, which can prevent the convergence of the
negotiations. Thus, the negotiation processes between cooperative rational agents may not be ﬁnite.
The individual rationality guarantees that the welfare of each agent is increased by each transaction. However, from the point
of view of the society, negotiations between individually rational agents may also lead to severely sub-optimal allocations. As a
consequence, a different acceptability criterion should be used to achieve better allocations society-wise. We propose the
notion of social agents which are willing to accept transactions that decrease their individual welfare as long as they favor the
welfare of the whole society.
Deﬁnition 12 (Social agent)   A social agent only accepts transactions ʴ(A) = A' that do not penalize the whole society.
sw(A)≥sw(A'),        A, A'∈ .
This deﬁnition is close to the deﬁnition of individually rational agents in (Endriss et al., 2006) when compensatory payments
are allowed. However, the different context leads to drastic changes in its practical use. Firstly, this criterion is based on global
knowledge which is not available at the agent level (the resource allocation). Secondly, the use of a weak inequality may lead
to inﬁnite negotiation processes like in the case of collaborative rationality described previously.
The formal deﬁnition of this social acceptability criterion is based on global information. However, we assume that the
knowledge of the agents is restricted to their own preferences, their own bundle or information that can be collected during a
negotiation (from related agents involved in the current transaction only). That way, an agent is neither aware of the current
resource assignment nor of the population size and the preferences of the other agents. Consequently, an agent does not
have enough information to determine the social welfare value, although computing the social welfare value is not essential.
Indeed, an agent merely needs to know whether the transaction increases or decreases the social welfare value. The
expression of the social acceptability criterion can be restricted to the transaction participants. Of course, the formula of the
acceptability criterion must be adapted with respect to the social notion considered, as described in the next paragraphs.
These restricted criteria are strict inequalities in order to guarantee the ﬁniteness of the negotiation processes.
Utilitarian sociability
Social agents accept transactions that do not harm the society, even if they decrease their individual welfare. Let us adapt the
generic formula to the speciﬁc case of utilitarian societies (Nongaillard et al., 2008). An utilitarian transaction ʴi
j = (ˁi, ˁj), which
transforms A in A'(A, A'∈ ), must satisfy the following condition:
swu(A) <   swu(A')    
ui(Ri) + uj(Rj) +  uk(Rk) <   ui(Ri') + uj(Rj') +  uk(Rk')    
ui(Ri) + uj(Rj) <   ui(Ri') + uj(Rj')    
ui(Ri) + uj(Rj) <   ui(Ri) + ui(ˁj) - ui(ˁi) + uj(Rj) + uj(ˁi) - uj(ˁj)    
ui(ˁi) + uj(ˁj) <   ui(ˁj) + uj(ˁi)    
In other words, if the partner associates a larger utility value with the resources offered than the initiator, then the transaction is
proﬁtable to the society. Each utilitarian transaction leads to a strict increase of the welfare of the society (if utility values are
not null). Note that the utilitarian interpretation of the social acceptability criterion is only based on the resources offered. The





In the case of an egalitarian society, transactions reduce inequalities between agents. A fair transaction ʴi
j = (ˁi, ˁj), which
transforms A in A'(A, A'∈ ), must satisfy the following conditions:
swe(A) ≤   swe(A')    
uk(Rk) ≤   uk(Rk')    
ui(Ri), uj(Rj) <   ui(Ri'), ui(Rj')    
The poorest agent after a fair transaction must be richer than the poorest agent before the transaction. When the egalitarian
welfare is considered, an increase of the welfare value cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, depending whether or not the poorest
agent is involved in the transaction, the egalitarian welfare value may not be increased. If the poorest agent is not involved, its
utility value, which corresponds to the egalitarian welfare value, does not vary since its resource bundle is not modiﬁed. Thus,
the egalitarian welfare value only changes if the poorest agent of the population is involved. In contrast to the utilitarian
acceptability criterion, which only depends on the traded resources, the egalitarian interpretation is based on the sets of traded
resources as well as on the initial individual welfare of each participant. According to such a criterion, a very rich agent may
accept to decrease its own utility for the beneﬁt of the whole society. In the case where the poorest agent is not involved in a
transaction, the egalitarian criterion favors the resource trafﬁc.
Nash sociability
The Nash welfare can be viewed as a compromise between the utilitarian and the egalitarian notions. The Nash interpretation
of the social acceptability criterion also combines the characteristics of both notions (Nongaillard et al., 2010; Nongaillard et al.,
2009). A Nash transaction ʴi
j = (ˁi, ˁj), which transforms A in A'(A, A'∈ ), must satisfy the following condition:
swn(A) <   swn(A')    
uk(Rk) <   uk(Rk')    
ui(Ri)uj(Rj) uk(Rk) <   ui(Ri')uj(Rj') uk(Rk')    
ui(Ri)uj(Rj) <   ui(Ri')uj(Rj')    
Each Nash transaction strictly improves the welfare of the society, like in utilitarian transactions. Similarly to the egalitarian
interpretation of the social acceptability criterion, the Nash criterion must be based on traded resources as well as on the
individual welfare of both participants.
Elitist negotiations
Elitist agents accept transactions ʴi
j = (ˁi, ˁj), changing A into A'(A, A'∈ ), if the following condition is satisﬁed:
swe (A) <   swe (A')    
uk(Rk) ≤   uk(Rk')    
ui(Ri), uj(Rj) <   ui(Ri'), ui(Rj')    






The richest of the two participants after an elitist transaction must be richer than the richest agent before this transaction.
Similarly to the egalitarian interpretation, an increase of the elitist welfare value cannot be guaranteed. However, the restriction
is not as strong as the restriction imposed in the egalitarian case. Indeed, if the poorest agent of the population is not involved,
the egalitarian welfare value cannot vary, but according to the elitist notion, even if the richest agent is not involved, the welfare
value can increase. Nothing prevents for instance another agent to become richer than the agent that was the richest before
the transaction.
Agent behaviors
A behavior deﬁnes an agent from an external point of view: it describes how an agent interacts with others, i.e. how they
negotiate. A transaction is a combination of offers from each participant. An agent initiating a negotiation selects a partner from
its neighborhood, makes and receives offers and checks their acceptability according to its own criterion. If a transaction is
acceptable for every participant, it is performed. Otherwise, one agent must modify its offer, in accordance with its behaviour,
and the negotiation continues. The order in which these actions are performed (if they are) constitutes a behavior.
Many behaviors have been implemented and tested but only the most efﬁcient (according to the quality of the solutions
achieved) is presented here (Nongaillard et al., 2008). Our experiments show that agents should be able to change their offers
and partners. Such a behavior is more time-consuming than stubborn behaviors (agents refuse to change their offers) but
leads negotiation processes to higher social welfare values. The order in which the actions are performed according to a
behavior also affects the efﬁciency of the negotiations. Three levels of priority can be distinguished: on the partner selection,
on initiator offers and on partner offers. Our experiments show that the behavior described next is the most efﬁcient.
According to the kinds of negotiation policy allowed, each agent can offer up to a maximum number of resources. Doing so,
they generate a list of the offers they can make according to their preferences and they sort it. Agents always propose the
least penalizing offer ﬁrst. In this behavior called frivolous ﬂexible, described in Algorithm 1, the offer and the partner can be
changed by the initiator during a negotiation. Each offer is proposed to every neighbor by the initiator ﬁrst of making a
concession and modifying the offer.
Note that when the utilitarian welfare is considered, the three priorities do not affect the results. Indeed, different negotiation
processes will lead to equivalent solutions. However, when other welfare notions are considered, these priorities, which deﬁne
the order of the actions, can lead to suboptimal allocations.
 Simulation results









the experimental protocol is described to present what simulations have been performed. Only simulations related to utilitarian
and egalitarian societies are analyzed in the next sections.
Evaluation metrics
In this experimental study, different aspects of negotiation processes are evaluated by to three main parameters.
The ﬁrst parameter is the transaction cardinality. Identifying an acceptable bilateral transaction may become a complex and
expensive task if large numbers of resources can be traded at once, as described in Section 3.4. In order to favor the
scalability of our method, restrictions on the transaction cardinality are essential. However, such restrictions may affect the
efﬁciency of negotiation processes. The aim is to determine if the use of large transactions is necessary to achieve socially
interesting allocations.
The second parameter we use to evaluate negotiation processes is the social efﬁciency. Although resource allocation
problems can be solved using a centralized framework, a solution provided by such a technique merely allocates the
resources optimally, without considering the transaction sequence required to achieve it. Such approaches cannot handle
restricted graphs in a scalable way. An omniscient central entity gathers every information, from bundles to agents
preferences, in order to determine the optimal outcome. Social welfare values provided by such centralized techniques can be
used as references to evaluate the absolute efﬁciency of our distributed mechanism. The centralized techniques used to
estimate the optimal value are described at the beginning of each result section.
The topological characteristics of a contact graph have a direct impact on the efﬁciency of negotiation processes. For this
reason, contact graphs from different classes are considered in order to evaluate the negotiation processes on representative
graphs. We focus on a speciﬁc parameter: the mean connectivity. The mean connectivity corresponds to the average number
of neighbors per agent and therefore represents the density of the contact graph. The aim is here to determine the size of the
neighborhood required to achieve socially efﬁcient allocations.
Simulation protocol
Having deﬁned how negotiation processes are evaluated, let us now describe how the simulations are performed.
Each experiment is set up as follows. An artiﬁcial society is composed of 50 agents (n = 50) and 250 resources (m = 250)
spread between them. Two types of structured graph (complete and grid) and two types of random graph (Erdős-R￩nyi 1959)
and small world (Albert & Barab￡si 2002) are considered. First of starting the experiment, a large number of scenarios are
generated: 10 graphs of each class and 10 sets of agent preferences. Then, 100 simulations are performed from different
initial allocations for each scenario (couple preference + graph). Two acceptability criteria are considered during the
simulations: the individual rationality and the sociability. Four negotiation policies are considered in each case: two allowing only
one type of transaction (gifts and swaps) and two allowing several types of transaction (''up to 〈1, 1〉'' and ''up to 〈2, 2〉'').
Since gifts cannot be individually rational, some negotiation policies do not exist in societies of individually rational agents.
The resources are initially distributed randomly. The preferences are also generated randomly in the range {1..m}. For
experiments focusing on connectivity, only Erdős-R￩nyi graphs are used and the probability p for a link to exist between two
agents varies from 0.05 to 1. During a negotiation process, the initiator agent is randomly chosen and the speech turn is
uniformly distributed: no agent can talk twice before all the others talked at least once. When no one is able to ﬁnd an
acceptable transaction, the negotiation process ends.
The size of the scenarios (50 agents and 250 resources) used for the simulations may seem light in contrast with the claimed
scalability of our approach. Yet, only a few studies in the literature include experiments, most of them being purely theoretical.
Among the experimental studies, the number of agents is often restricted to less than 10, with a maximum of 20 resources
(Estivie et al., 2006; Ramezani & Endriss, 2009; Chevaleyre et al., 2007; Andersson & Sandholm, 1998), which is far beyond
our parameters. Also, we choose to evaluate the social efﬁciency. In this purpose, the optimal social value, which is estimated
owing to centralized techniques, is used as a reference for comparisons. The complexity of allocation problems is exponential
with respect to the population size and to the size of the resources set. Besides, the estimation of the optimal value according
to these centralized techniques is very time-consuming. For this reason, the comparison with the estimation of the optimal
results is the main limiting factor to the size of our experiments.
 Utilitarian negotiations
Impact of the transaction cardinality
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evolution of the utilitarian welfare value in function of the computation time. The efﬁciency of different negotiation policies,
classiﬁed with respect to the maximum number of resources proposed by the agents, can also be compared. The best
negotiation policy leads to the largest social welfare value in a minimum time.
Figure 3: Impact of the transaction cardinality on utilitarian negotiations
Figure 3 shows that, independently of the cardinality of the allowed transactions, all negotiation processes converge towards
very close utilitarian welfare values whereas the computation time required for the convergence quite varies. The negotiation
policy based on gifts ( 〈1, 0〉 transactions) leads to a faster convergence towards the largest welfare value. Larger bilateral
transactions do not allow the achievement of higher utilitarian allocations although they are more time consuming. Negotiation
processes based either on gifts ( 〈0, 1〉 transactions), swaps ( 〈1, 1〉 transactions) or both end after about 1 second
while 10 seconds are required in the case of the negotiation policy ''up to 〈3, 3〉'' for instance. Negotiation processes based
on swaps end on socially weaker allocations. Since the initial resource distribution cannot be modiﬁed, negotiation processes
based on swaps end on weaker local optima. The improvement of the welfare value is quicker when agents negotiate either
using ''up to 〈1, 1〉'' or 〈1, 1〉 transactions. It can represent an interesting alternative if a good approximation is required in
a short time. However, it strongly depends on the mean number of resource per agent. In these experiments, agents own an
average of 5 resources in their bundle but larger resource bundles affect the convergence speed. Indeed, larger resource
bundles mean a higher number of possible transactions between each pair of agents, and thus lead to a decrease in gradient
of the corresponding curves.
Proposition 5 (Utilitarian bilateral transaction decomposition)   Any bilateral transaction satisfying the utilitarian criterion can
be decomposed into a sequence of utilitarian gifts leading at least to a socially equivalent allocation.
Proof. Let us consider a bilateral transaction between two agents i, j∈  changing the initial allocation A into A'. It can be
formulated by deﬁnition as follows:
ʴi
j〈X, 0〉 = (ˁi,∅) is social    ⃒    swu(A) < swu(A').    
Two cases can occur.
All the resources offered by the initiator are more valued by the partner.
∀r∈ˁi, ui(r) < uj(r)    ⃒    ∀r∈ˁi, ʴi
j〈1, 0〉 = (r,∅) is social.    
In such a case, the decomposition of the initial transaction ʴi
j〈X, 0〉 = (ˁi,∅) into a sequence of social 〈1, 0〉-
transactions leading to the same allocation is trivial.
The initiator values (at least) one resource from its offer more than the partner involved. In such a case, the
transaction cannot be split into a sequence of utilitarian gifts. However, this transaction is suboptimal. There exists a




∃r∈ˁi, ui(r) < uj(r)    ⃒    ʴi
j〈X - 1, 0〉 = (ˁi   {r},∅) is social.    
  and swu(A'') > swu(A') > swu(A).    
Indeed, removing from the initiator's offer all the resources less valued by the partner constitutes a new transaction
leading to a socially greater allocation A''.
swu(A'') = swu(A) -  ui(r') +  uj(r')    
  = swu(A') + ui(r) - uj(r)    
  > swu(A')    
This removing condition can be applied as long as offered resources, less valued by the partner, appear in the initiator's offer.
The new transaction satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition and can be split in a sequence of social gifts. A similar argument can be used
with 〈X, Y〉-transactions, which can ﬁrst be decomposed into a 〈X, 0〉-transaction and a 〈Y, 0〉-transaction. Hence, all
bilateral transactions satisfying the utilitarian criterion can be decomposed in a sequence of utilitarian gifts either leading to the
same allocation (as many gifts as resources in the initiator's offer), or leading to a socially greater allocation (the sequence is
shorter than the size of the initiator's offer). 
Since the utilitarian welfare value achieved is similar regardless of the transaction cardinality, the use of large bilateral
transactions is not justiﬁed due to important additional costs. Besides, restrictions on the transaction cardinality do not harm
the efﬁciency of negotiation processes.
Utilitarian efﬁciency
In order to determine the social efﬁciency of negotiation processes, the optimal social value must be computed according to a
centralized technique. In the context of this study, the optimal utilitarian welfare value can be determined using Algorithm 2.
Table 4 presents the efﬁciency of negotiation processes based on different negotiation policies, acceptability criteria and
classes of contact graph. This table shows the proportion of the optimal welfare value that can be achieved (the greater the
proportion, the more efﬁcient the negotiation process).





〈 〈1, 1〉 〉 up to 〈 〈2, 2〉 〉 〈 〈1, 0〉 〉 〈 〈1, 1〉 〉 up to 〈 〈1, 1〉 〉 up to 〈 〈2, 2〉 〉
Full 96.6 97.0 100 98.3 100 100
Grid 79.0 81.3 86.2 85.3 86.1 86.1
Erdős-R￩nyi 94.8 95.0 98.9 97.1 98.9 98.9




When considering complete graphs, different negotiation policies always lead to optimal resource allocations. The transactions
of weakest cardinality, which achieve optimal allocations, are social 〈1, 0〉 transactions (social gifts). Any negotiation policy
that includes social gifts, like ''up to 〈1, 1〉'', ''up to 〈2, 2〉'' or ''up to 〈3, 3〉'' also achieves socially optimal resource
allocations. However, their use leads to important additional costs. The use of social gifts is sufﬁcient to achieve optimal
allocations when the utilitarian welfare is considered. Table 4 also shows that, independently of the social graph class, rational
negotiation processes always lead to socially weaker allocations than social negotiation processes. The restrictive character
of the acceptability criterion affects the resource circulation and consequently the quality of the provided solution. We can
observe that agents in an artiﬁcial society must be able to give resources without counterpart. Negotiation policies that
exclude such actions, i.e. if gifts are forbidden or never considered as acceptable, lead to socially weaker results. Generosity
between the agents of the population is an essential characteristic to achieve an optimal allocation in utilitarian societies.
Theorem 6   Within an utilitarian society where agents express their preferences by means of additive utility functions,
negotiation processes based on complete social graphs always converge towards a global optimum using only social 〈1, 0〉
transactions.
Proof. Since the contact graph is fully connected, any agent  i∈  can communicate with every other agent j∈    {i}. If a
social 〈1, 0〉 transaction containing r can be performed between agents i and j, then uj(r) > ui(r) according to the deﬁnition of
a social transaction. It is always possible to create a sequence of social 〈1, 0〉 transactions moving a resource into the
bundle of an agent that associates the largest utility value with it. Applying this process to each resource, the resulting
allocation is always a global optimum. 
The more restrictions on a contact graph, the less efﬁcient the negotiations. The combination of a restricted graph like a grid
and the use of rational swaps, which signiﬁcantly restrict the transaction possibilities (since initial resource distributions cannot
be modiﬁed), leads to the worst social efﬁciency: Only 79% of the optimal welfare value can be achieved. When grids are
considered, social negotiation processes achieve up to 86.2% of the optimum. The weak mean connectivity handicaps the
resource trafﬁc and hence the achievement of socially efﬁcient allocations. Negotiation processes lead to allocations
associated with up to 98.9% of the optimal welfare value when Erdős-R￩nyi graphs (p = 0.5) are considered. Only 91.4% of
the optimum is achieved when small-worlds are considered. In an Erdős-R￩nyi graph, the probability for an edge to link any
pair of nodes is always the same, while in small-worlds, the probability to link one agent is proportional to the number of agents
in its neighborhood. Many agents only have one neighbor and the resource trafﬁc is unequally distributed. Therefore,
bottlenecks (i.e. agents that block the resource circulation) may appear. Swaps are the least efﬁcient transactions, but the
difference is generally small. Since the number of resources per agent cannot vary, the resource circulation is very limited.
Inﬂuence of the social graph connectivity
The topology of the contact graph affects the resource trafﬁc as well as the negotiation efﬁciency. Large agent neighborhoods
correspond to dense contact graphs which facilitate the circulation of the resources. Figure 4 shows the impact of the mean
connectivity on the negotiation processes efﬁciency. It represents the evolution of the utilitarian welfare value in function of the
computation time. Only social gifts are allowed between agents.




This ﬁgure shows that a weak probability (which corresponds to small agent neighborhoods) leads utilitarian welfare values to
be far from the optimum. For instance, when p = 0.05 the negotiations stop after about 0.5 second although ending on
allocations socially far from the optimum. The gradual increase of the probability p leads to longer transaction sequences, to
the achievement of greater utilitarian welfare values and to more time-consuming negotiations. Larger neighborhoods facilitate
the resource circulation by offering a larger number of possible transactions to all the agents. The impact becomes really
signiﬁcant when p < 0.3. Above this value, the resource circulation is sufﬁcient to achieve socially interesting allocations, yet
below this threshold social graphs are too restricted and the ﬂexibility of the social acceptability criterion cannot compensate
the restrictiveness of the graph topologies.
 Egalitarian negotiations
Inﬂuence of the transaction cardinality
Figure 5 shows the inﬂuence of the transaction cardinality on the evolution of the egalitarian welfare value during the
negotiation processes.
Figure 5: Impact of the transaction cardinality on fair negotiations
Figure 5 shows ﬁrst that egalitarian negotiations are much more time-consuming compared to utilitarian negotiations. It also
shows that three negotiation policies lead to similar welfare value but different convergence times, while two other negotiation
policies achieve weaker results. Indeed, the negotiation policies ''up to 〈1, 1〉'', ''up to 〈2, 2〉'' and ''up to 〈3, 3〉'' achieve
similar social values but are respectively more and more time consuming. The negotiation policy ''up to 〈1, 1〉'', which is
included in the two others, is the simplest policy associated with the best efﬁciency. The other negotiation policies lead to
useless additional costs that do not improve the fairness of the artiﬁcial society. Several ﬂoors can be observed in the
evolution of the egalitarian welfare value. These ﬂoors characterize speciﬁc negotiation periods during which the poorest
agent of the population is not involved in the performed transactions, as described previously in Section 3.4.2. Negotiation
processes based on social gifts end quickly. However, provided solutions are associated to social values far from the values
achieved by larger bilateral transactions. Negotiation processes based on social 〈1, 1〉 transactions (social swaps) require
a large number of performed transactions, which barely improves the social welfare value and ends on socially very weak
allocations. Since such processes are time consuming and inefﬁcient, the exclusive use of swaps should be avoided. Using a
set of allowed transactions larger than ʔ = {〈1, 0〉,〈1, 1〉} is pointless since it leads to additional costs without any
signiﬁcant improvement on the solution quality. The set of allowed transactions must be larger when fair artiﬁcial societies are
considered than in the case of utilitarian population.
Egalitarian efﬁciency
In order to determine the social efﬁciency of negotiation processes, the optimal egalitarian value must be computed relying on
a centralized technique. However, there does not exist a simple algorithm like in the case of utilitarian societies. Egalitarian
resource allocation problems can be formulated by means of a mathematical model and solved using a linear program solver
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/14/3/5.html 16 31/07/20116.4
for instance. Our model is based on Boolean variables describing the ownership of a resource by an agent: xir = 1 if resource
r belongs to agent i, xir = 0 otherwise. Egalitarian resource allocation problems can thus be written as follows:
swe
opt = 
The objective is the maximization of the poorest agent welfare. Two consistency constraints are also deﬁned. The ﬁrst
ensures that each resource is allocated to a single agent while the second speciﬁes that all resources are atomic, unique and
not shareable. Such a technique can estimate the optimal egalitarian value but is very time-consuming.
Table 5 shows the impact of the graph topology on the egalitarian negotiation efﬁciency.





〈 〈1, 1〉 〉 up to 〈 〈2, 2〉 〉 〈 〈1, 0〉 〉 〈 〈1, 1〉 〉 up to 〈 〈1, 1〉 〉 up to 〈 〈2, 2〉 〉
Full 19.3 20.8 78.5 24.1 99.9 99.9
Grid 13.9 14.6 66.2 23.6 80.2 80.6
Erdős-R￩nyi 17.4 20.2 77.3 23.8 96.1 96.6
Small world 13.1 13.9 63.8 23.4 78.1 78.2
Table 5 shows that generally, negotiations among rational agents achieve unfair allocations. Indeed, independently of the kinds
of allowed transactions and of the social graph topology, rational negotiation processes end far from the optimal welfare value.
Only 20% of the optimal welfare value is achieved in the best cases. The individual rationality, which is widely used in the
literature, is not an efﬁcient acceptability criterion. Even on complete graphs, no social negotiation policy can guarantee the
achievement of egalitarian optima. Whereas social gifts are well adapted to the solution of utilitarian problems, they do not suit
the negotiations within egalitarian societies. Only 78.5% of the optimum can be achieved in the best cases. Indeed, after a
ﬁnite number of transactions, agents can not give a resource without becoming poorer than their partners were initially. The
exclusive use of gifts is then not sufﬁcient to lead negotiations to socially efﬁcient resource allocations. Negotiations based
only on social swaps lead to severely sub-optimal resource allocations with an efﬁciency of 24.1% on complete social graphs
in the best case. Such a weak efﬁciency is mainly due to the inherent constraints of swap transactions. Since the resource
distribution cannot be modiﬁed, a poor agent who only has few resources initially penalizes a lot the egalitarian negotiation
process. When both gifts and swaps are allowed, the negotiation efﬁciency is really close to the optimum. Larger bilateral
transactions bring a small improvement on the fairness among agents but are much more expensive to determine.
Theorem 7   Within an egalitarian society where agents express their preferences by means of additive utility functions,
bilateral transactions cannot guarantee the achievement of an egalitarian optimum, independently of the social graph
considered.
Proof. Let us consider a counter-example, based on a population of three agents   = {1, 2, 3} and a set of three available
resources   = {r1, r2, r3}. The agent preferences are described in Table 6.
Table 6:Insufﬁciency of bilateral






1 2 1 5
2 5 2 1
3 1 5 2
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6.7
The complete social graph is described in Figure 6 with the initial resource allocation A = [{r1}{r2}{r3}].
Figure 6:Deadlock in egalitarian negotiations
This ﬁgure also describes the only egalitarian transaction that would be acceptable. No sequence of acceptable bilateral
transactions can lead to an optimal resource allocation. Six gifts are possible but none can be performed since they are not
social. Indeed, if an agent gives a resource, its bundle becomes empty and the egalitarian welfare value becomes null. Three
swaps are possible, but for each the welfare value decreases, which means that the transaction is not acceptable. Hence,
even if the multiagent system is completely connected, the optimal solution cannot be achieved using only bilateral
transactions. Only a multilateral transaction corresponding to three simultaneous gifts is acceptable as described in Figure 6.
Since bilateral transactions are not sufﬁcient when negotiations are based on a complete social graph, they are also not
sufﬁcient when the social graph is restricted. In such cases, less transactions are possible and unacceptable transactions on
a complete social graph are still unacceptable on a restricted social graph.
Graphs of weaker mean connectivity like grids lead negotiation processes to socially weaker allocations. In the case of small
worlds, many agents only have a few neighbors, which may penalize egalitarian negotiations. Indeed, if such agents cannot
identify an acceptable transaction with their unique neighbor, some resources may be trapped in their bundle.
Impact of the contact graph connectivity
Figure 7 presents the impact of the mean connectivity on negotiations within egalitarian societies.
Figure 7: Impact of the graph connectivity on egalitarian negotiations
Similarly to utilitarian negotiations, this ﬁgure shows that a high probability (corresponding to a dense social graph) leads to
longer sequences of transactions during negotiation processes, moreover achieving a higher welfare value. Larger
neighborhoods facilitate the resource circulation by offering larger numbers of possible transactions to all agents. The impact







of the connectivity is important provided the probability p of generating edges is very low. Like in negotiations on utilitarian
societies, the impact of the connectivity is not linear: it becomes really signiﬁcant below p≤0.5. Societies require a denser
contact graph to achieve interesting allocations when fairness is considered.
 Conclusion
A large variety of applications can be modeled as resource reallocation problems. Yet, studies investigating such problems do
not always consider an adequately realistic context. Considering that neither omniscient agents nor unrestricted interaction
possibilities represent a realistic environment, the knowledge of the agents in our approach is limited to local information and
their possible interaction is deﬁned by a contact graph. Compensatory payments are also prohibited in order to avoid inﬁnite
agent wallet.
We also consider that centralized techniques are not best suited for searching transaction sequences leading to an optimal
allocation. Therefore, we focus in this paper on distributing solving methods based on agent negotiations. We seek to deﬁne
the optimal behavior maximizing the welfare of the whole society. To that end, we propose the agent behavior and the
negotiation policy allowing the achievement of socially optimal allocations according to different welfare functions. The
ﬁniteness of the negotiation processes is guaranteed by an acceptability criterion enabling the agents to determine the
proﬁtability of a transaction on a local basis. In this paper, we show that negotiations between individually rational agents do not
lead to socially interesting allocations. We propose a new criterion, sociability, that certiﬁes that agents accept any transaction
that do not harm the society. The expression of this social acceptability criterion is detailed according to the four main welfare
notions. The agent behavior required to achieve socially interesting state in agent societies is also described.
We choose to evaluate different aspects of negotiation processes in a large number of simulations. The efﬁciency of the
negotiation settings is quantiﬁed by means of a comparison with optimal solutions estimated by centralized techniques. We
also evaluate the impact of the transaction cardinality, of the graph connectivity and the quality of provided solutions. We show
that the use of large bilateral transactions is not essential to achieve optimal allocations. Indeed, it does not lead to signiﬁcant
improvements of the solution but to an important increase of the computational costs. Bilateral transactions of restricted
cardinality are sufﬁcient to achieve socially interesting allocations.
The most efﬁcient negotiation policies are summarized in Table 7 according to the social welfare notion considered.
A negotiation policy based on social gifts is sufﬁcient to achieve optimal allocations when complete
contact graphs are considered. This negotiation policy also leads to the best results on restricted graphs (structured
and random graphs).
The use of bilateral transactions cannot guarantee the achievement of optimal allocations, even on
complete contact graphs. However, a negotiation policy based on social gifts and social swaps is sufﬁcient to
achieve socially efﬁcient allocations.






social 〈1, 0〉 transactions
suboptimal (99%)
social 〈1, 0〉 transactions
Restricted suboptimal
social ''up to 〈1, 1〉'' transactions
suboptimal
social ''up to 〈1, 1〉'' transactions
Unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd that the topology of the contact graphs has a signiﬁcant impact on the efﬁciency of the negotiation
processes, yet lessened when utilitarian societies are considered. A very weak mean connectivity will drastically affect the
efﬁciency whereas an irregular topology will not. In fair artiﬁcial societies, a more important connectivity is required to achieve
fair allocations. Regular topologies also lead to better results because isolated agents trap resources easily, affecting the
efﬁciency of the negotiations.
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